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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)0).
ISSUE & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Based on the undisputed material facts, did the trial court properly grant
RB&Gfs first motion for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs' negligence
claims were barred by the economic loss rule and Enterprises1 contract claim failed for
lack of privity?
Standard of Review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate
court reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is
entitled to summary judgment presents a question of law and the appellate court grants no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See
Higgins. 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center. 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App.
1997). Summary judgment is not precluded simply whenever some facts remain in
dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted. See Heglar Ranch. Inc.
v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). On appeal, this Court should "determine
only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial
court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Harline v.
Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996).

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES.
RULES AND REGULATIONS
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/Appellants Sunridge Development Corp. (Development) and
Sunridge Enterprises, LLC (Enterprises) (collectively referred to as the Sunridge entities)
initiated this appeal from the trial court's grant of the first of two summary judgment
motions filed by RB&G. Although both Sunridge entities are a party to this appeal, the
only issue on appeal is whether Enterprises may recover damages against RB&G.
In the proceedings before the trial court, RB&G submitted a second motion
for summary judgment with respect to Development's claims, arguing that its claims
failed for lack of proof of damages. The trial court granted RB&G's second summary
judgment motion. Thereafter, and in order to expedite the process for this appeal, the
parties entered into a stipulation whereby Development agreed not to appeal the trial
court's second summary judgment ruling and Development's claims. The dismissal of
Development's claims was with prejudice. Accordingly, the second summary judgment
motion and Development's claims are not before this court on appeal. Any arguments
relating to Development are not properly presented in this appeal, which the Sunridge
entities state is only an appeal from the first summary judgment.
With respect to the trial court's grant of summary judgment on RB&G's first
motion for summary judgment, the issues are straightforward applications of law to a set
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of undisputed material facts. It is undisputed that the only damages asserted by either
Sunridge entity are for purely economic damages. It is undisputed that the damages being
sought were incurred by Enterprises. Also, it is undisputed that the only contracts in this
case were between RB&G and Development. At the time the contract was agreed upon
and at the time that RB&G performed on the contract, Enterprises had not been created.
After RB&G's performance on the contract, Development sold the land for the Sunridge
project to Enterprises.
Later, both Development and Enterprises alleged that the RB&G report was
deficient and forced the project to contain fewer units than anticipated by the Sunridge
entities. In this action, both Development and Enterprises jointly asserted breach of
contract claims and negligence claims against RB&G. The sole issue on appeal is
whether Enterprises may recover damages from RB&G where it has no contract with
RB&G and where Utah's economic loss rule precludes recovery in tort for purely
economic damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Contract Between Development and RB&G
This appeal concerns the Alpine Brook Townhome development located in
Provo, Utah. (R. at 230). In 1981, Development purchased an 87-acre parcel of property,
10.2 acres of which would later become the Alpine Brook development. (R. at 372). In
1993, Development contracted RB&G to perform a Preliminary Geology analysis of a
proposed development known as Sunridge, which would include the Alpine Brook
3

development. (R. at 231). On June 23, 1993, RB&G submitted its analysis report to
Development. (R. at 231). In 1995, Development contracted RB&G again to perform a
Preliminary Geology analysis of the Alpine Brook development, and in August 1995,
RB&G submitted its analysis report to Development. (R. at 231). All contracts at issue in
this appeal were between Development and RB&G and were performed between 19931995. (R. at 548).
Corporate Organization of Sunridge Limits Its Ability to Recover
Development is a Utah corporation formed in March 1969. (R. at 230).
Stephen G. Stewart is a principal of Development. (R. at 233). Sunridge Enterprises,
L.L.C. was created in March 1996 for the purpose of buying the Alpine Brook
development. (R. at 374; 230; 253). Stephen G. Stewart is also a principal of Enterprises.
(R. at 233). Enterprises was intentionally created as a separate entity to limit or allocate
the Sunridge entities' liability exposure on the project. (R. at 268). When asked in his
deposition why Enterprises was created as a separate entity, Mr. Stewart responded: "Our
attorneys told us the liability exposure would be less with an LLC." (R. at 268).
Development sold the Alpine Brook parcel to Enterprises in 1996. (R. at
374). Enterprises did not have a contract directly with RB&G. (R. at 548). At the time of
the sale, Development purportedly assigned and transferred all of its rights and claims
regarding the various engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals, etc., to
Enterprises. (R. at 374). Other than Mr. Stewart's affidavit, however, no proof of this
assignment has ever been entered into the record. RB&G completed performance of its
4

contracts with Development prior to any purported assignment of Development's contract
rights to Enterprises. (R. at 550). Thus, at the time of the purported assignment,
Enterprises only remaining right on the RB&G contracts was the right to enforce those
contracts in the event of a RB&G breach and to pursue Development's remedies resulting
from any such breach. (R. at 550). This was the only right that Development could have
assigned to Enterprises. (R. at 550).
Procedural Details of Case
The Sunridge entities filed suit against RB&G on February 5, 2003, for its
alleged breach of these contracts and/or for RB&G's negligent acts, errors or omissions in
the performance of the contracts. (R. at 1). In the Amended Complaint, the Sunridge
entities jointly alleged that RB&G breached its contract(s) with Development and/or
negligently performed its services, thereby damaging the Sunridge entities. (R. at 14).
RB&G filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment on the
negligence and breach of contract claims on March 8, 2005. (R. at 225). In this first
summary judgment motion, RB&G argued Development's and Enterprises' tort claims
were barred by the economic loss rule. Also RB&G argued that Enterprises could not
assert its own breach of contract claim due to lack of privity. In opposition to RB&Gfs
motion and for the first time in the case, the Sunridge entities argued that Development
had assigned its rights under the contract to Enterprises. Also, the Sunridge entities
argued that RB&G owed an independent duty to Enterprises in order to avoid the
economic loss rule. (R. at 362-390). On August 2, 2005, the trial court granted RB&G's
5

motion for summary judgment and partial summary judgment holding that Development
and Enterprises negligence claims were barred by Utah's economic loss rule and that the
lack of contractual privity between Enterprises and RB&G limited Enterprises ability to
recover damages to the damages, if any, suffered by Development. (R. at 538).
RB&G submitted a second motion for summary judgment on July 25, 2006,
with respect to Development's claims. (R. at 575). In this motion, RB&G argued that
Development had failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove its damages. The trial
court also granted RB&Gfs second summary judgment motion. (R. at 697, 722-27). The
parties then entered into a stipulation to expedite this appeal whereby Development
agreed not to appeal the trial court's second summary judgment ruling on its proof of
damages. (R. at 736). The stipulated motion to dismiss with prejudice Development's
remaining claims for lack of proof of damages was entered on December 18, 2006. (R. at
736-37) Accordingly, the second summary judgment motion and Development's claims
are not before this court on appeal, and this appeal addresses solely the issues from the
August 2, 2005 ruling on RB&G's first summary judgment motion.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In this appeal, the Sunridge entities are hoist on their own petard. The
Sunridge entities attempted to limit their own exposure to liability by creating two
separate entities: Development and Enterprises. When asked why Enterprises was
created, both entity's principal, Steven Stewart, responded: "Our attorneys told us the
liability exposure would be less with an LLC." (R. at 268). In limiting the liability
6

exposure, however, the Sunridge entities effectively cut off their ability to recover any
damages incurred by Enterprises.
Development entered into a contract with RB&G that provided
Development with rights and liabilities under the contract. Later Development sold the
land for the Sunridge project and purportedly assigned its rights under the DevelopmentRB&G contracts to Enterprises; however, Development continued to exist. In fact, after
the assignment, Development asserted its own claims against RB&G for breach of
contract. Effectively, Development was a separate company that insulated Enterprises
from any outside liability and preserved Enterprises1 assets. Had RB&G not been paid by
Development, RB&G would have had no ability to seek recovery from Enterprises - as
RB&G's contract was with Development which was still a functioning entity. By
insulating their assets from outside liability through the creation of separate entities,
however, the very device that the Sunridge entities used to protect themselves from any
outside claims became the Sunridge entities1 undoing when it came time to assert their
own claims here.
In opposing RB&Gfs motion for summary judgment and now on appeal, the
Sunridge entities repeatedly argue that this situation is 'unfair/ The situation is not unfair;
it is a product of how the Sunridge entities chose to do business. Moreover, the problem
with their claims was created solely because the Sunridge entities wanted to limit their
own liability exposure to outside claims. Undoubtedly, the Sunridge entities would not
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claim it was unfair to deprive a third party's claim against one of them or offer to excuse
the corporate formalities they so carefully created if the shoe was on the other foot.
ARGUMENT
I.

AN ASSIGNEE'S DAMAGES ARE SOLELY LIMITED TO THOSE
DAMAGES THE ASSIGNOR COULD ASSERT.
In this case, two separate entities are attempting to cobble together a breach

of contract claim through a purported assignment of rights. "The elements of a prima
facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking
recovery, (3) breach of contract by the other party, and (4) damages." Campbell Maack
& Sessions v. DeBrv, 38 P.3d 984, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). Enterprises, lacking
elements 1 through 3, attempted to use Development's assignment to satisfy elements 1
through 3, and then combined its own damages with Development's damages to create a
larger claim.
The law of assignments, however, does not allow separate entities to pool
their damages together in order to create a more substantial claim. Instead, the assignee
of a claim may only assert those claims that the assignor would be able to assert. See
Aird Ins. Agency v. Zions First Nat'l Bank. 612 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980) (where
assignor's interest in bank account was satisfied, assignee had no claim to assign). Under
Utah law, when an the assignor assigns a portion of its rights under a contract but remains
a party to the assigned contract, the assignee's rights are subject to the actions of the
assignor. See Wiscombe v. Lockhart Co.. 608 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 1980).
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In its brief, the Sunridge entities argue that by virtue of the assignment
Enterprises is now in privity of contract with RB&G which then allows Enterprises to
assert its own damages as if it was a party to the contract. The Sunridge entities
fundamentally misunderstand the law of assignments. An assignment does not allow the
assignee to claim damages that it allegedly suffered. Rather, the assignee is allowed to
seek recovery of the damages the assignor allegedly suffered. Indeed, the case relied on
by Sunridge to argue to the contrary says as much. See Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ^|40,
44 P.3d 742 (holding the assignee is entitled to bring any contract action that the assignor
could have brought). Because Development could not assert Enterprises' claims,
Enterprises, by virtue of the assignment of Development's claims, cannot assert its own
claims. The Spears opinion says nothing about the assignee being able to assert its own
damages through an assignment. See Spears, 2002 UT 24 at TJT|37-40. To the extent an
assignment creates privity, it does so in the context of allowing the assignee to stand in
the shoes of the assignor. If Development's shoes are a size 9, then Enterprises, by virtue
of the assignment, must stand in Development's size 9 shoes, even if Enterprises might
normally where a size 11.
In contrast to the Sunridge entities' argument on appeal, Utah law has
consistently precluded parties from doing what the Sunridge entities argue in this case.
For example, in Wiscombe, the purchaser of real property assigned a portion of its right to
the real estate purchase contract (REPC) to a third party. After the assignment was made
and after the assignee had recorded the assignment against the real property, the assignor
9

defaulted on the REPC. The assignee attempted to the cure the default. The Utah
Supreme Court held the assignee had no right to cure as its rights under the assignment
were compromised by the assignor's default. See id.; see also concurring opinion of Hall,
J., 608 P.2d at 238-39. In the context of ongoing performance on a contract by the
assignor, the Supreme Court stated: "Such an assignment does not have the effect of
canceling any rights which other persons have in connection with such property." See id.
at 238. Thus, under Utah law, where the assignor retains some interest in the matter
being assigned, the assignee's rights under the assignment are subject to the assignor's
subsequent action on the contract.
In this case, Development remained a party to the contract with RB&G.
Development asserted damages against RB&G for breach of contract. Development
asserted these claims after its assignment to Enterprises. Like the assignment in
Wiscombe. Development assigned only its "rights and benefits" under the contract with
RB&G. Development remained liable on the contract to RB&G. See Wiscombe, 608
P.2d at 238-39 (Hall, J., concurring). Accordingly, Enterprises, through its assignment
from Development, was limited to only what Development could assert. Enterprises
could not assert both Development's claims and its own damages.
An assignment does not allow separate and distinct entities to collectively
create and assert a single cause of action. In other words, Enterprises, as assignee, cannot
assert Development's breach of contract cause of action but seek its damages in
conjunction with the assigned claim. See West v. Inter-Financial Inc., 2006 UT App
10

222, n. 1, 139 P.3d 1059; see also Havsv v. Flvnn, 945 P.2d 221, 223 (Wash. App. 1997)
(plaintiff could not recover on assigned claims where assignor had not incurred any
damages to assign); Kurent v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc., 581 N.E.2d 533, 537 (Ohio
1991) (discussing that although insurance company would have its own damages to seek,
the insurance company could not recover through subrogation action where its insureds
had no right of recovery); Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Trailing Co., 180 F.3d
518, 524 (3rd Cir. 1999) (assignee could not recover additional damages it incurred, but
only damages that assignor could recover). In West, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected
the argument advanced by the Sunridge entities in this case. Specifically, the Court noted
that the plaintiffs attempted use of an assignment to create a breach of contract claim
failed because the assignor had no damages to assign. See West, 2006 UT App 222 at n.
1. Thus, the plaintiffs in West, although they had suffered damages, could not assert a
breach of contract claim because the assignor could not assign more than what the
assignor had to offer. See id.
Moreover, the fact that an assignee incurred damages which it paid to the
assignor does not mean that the assignee can recover the money it paid by an assignment
when the assignor had no damages to assign.1 Moreover, it makes no difference that the

1

See Nova Information Systems, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., NAC, 365 F.3d
996, 1004 (11th Cir. 2004) (even though plaintiff incurred loss because it paid assignors'
claims who then assigned claims to plaintiff, plaintiff could not recover on assigned
claims because the assignor had already been reimbursed for loss and had no damages to
assign); State v. Lester, 608 P.2d 588, 589-90 (Or. App. 1980) (even though State had
provided support payments to mother, State, as assignee of mother's rights, could not
11

assignor could have incurred the damages, but did not. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
AIG Hawai'i Ins. Co., Inc.. 126 P.3d 386, 392 (Hawai'i 2006) (insurer could not recover
attorney fees it incurred in defending its insured by taking an assignment of its insured's
claims where insured failed to incur any out of pocket costs for attorney fees). In
Fireman's Fund, the insurer, through an assignment, attempted to assert its own out of
pocket costs which the court disallowed through the assigned claim from the insured,
holding the insured had no out of pocket expenses, or damages, to assign. See id.
Enterprises may assert Development's assigned claims, but it is limited to
Development's damages. Enterprises cannot seeks its own damages. Furthermore,
Enterprises cannot seek damages that Development could have incurred but did not
actually incur. As the assignee, Enterprises cannot enhance the value of the assigned
claims by aggregating both Development's damages and its own damages together.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD AND APPLIED
THE SME OPINION REGARDING THE EFFECT OF AN
ASSIGNMENT TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
In arguing the trial court misapplied SME2 as it pertains to an assignment of

claims in the context of the economic loss doctrine, the Sunridge entities argue that
Enterprises is trying to recover the damages that Development could have recovered but
for the assignment. In essence, the Sunridge entities argue that when the assignment
recover from father where divorce decree did not require father to make support
payments).
2

SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett Stainback & Associates, Inc.,
2001 UT 54, 28 P.3d 669.
12

occurred Development had a possible claim that was not yet ripe because it had no
damages. Before it could incur those damages, it assigned its rights to Enterprises.
Enterprises then incurred the damages that the Sunridge entities argue that Development
could have incurred. In this case, however, Development also asserted its own damages
for breach of contract.
For the most part, the Sunridge entities' detailed recitation of SME is
accurate. The Sunridge entities go through an exhaustive analysis in an attempt to
demonstrate why the limited analysis pertaining to damages from the assignment in SME
is not applicable to this case. First, the SME decision actually contains no discussion
about the amount of damages that SME could recover under the assignment. See SME,
2001 UT 54 at ^[16. All the opinion states is basic assignment law:

,f

SME's damages, if

any, are limited to those damages suffered by the County as a result of TVSAfs alleged
breach of the County-TVSA contract inasmuch as SME may recover only what the
County could recover from TVS A per the assignment." Id. In point of fact Sunridge is
probably correct that because the County settled for $150,000, SME was limited in its
recovery to $150,000; however, that is an assumption that is not set forth in the opinion.
The remainder of Sunridge's argument relating to SME, however, is incorrect. An
assignment does not create privity between RB&G and Enterprises, as assignee, to allow
Enterprises to assert its own damages. Instead, the assignment allows Enterprises to step
into Development's shoes and assert Development's damages. As stated in SME, "the
assignee never stands in a better position than the assignor." Id. (emphasis in original).
13

Thus, the exact language from SME applies equally in this case if the parties from this
case are switched with those in the SME opinion: "[Enterprises'] damages, if any, are
limited to those damages suffered by [Development] as a result of [RB&Gfs] alleged
breach of the [Development-RB&G] contract inasmuch as [Enterprises] may recover only
what [Development] could recover from [RB&G] per the assignment.1' IdL
The Sunridge entities cannot have it both ways: they cannot disregard the
corporate form for some purposes, but observe it when it is convenient to do so. Because
the Sunridge entities are distinct and separate entities, the law governing assignments
precludes Enterprises from asserting its own discrete damages through an assigned breach
of contract claim. Enterprises was limited to Development's damages, and the trial court
properly applied the law to the undisputed facts.
III.

DEVELOPMENT AND ENTERPRISES CANNOT DISREGARD
CORPORATE FORMALITIES WHEN IT IS CONVENIENT
TO DO SO,
The situation that the Sunridge entities now find themselves in is a product

of their own making, and they must accept the reciprocal obligations of the corporate
structure. The Sunridge entities may not evade the consequences of their corporate form.
Development created Enterprises to benefit from its separate corporate identity, namely to
avoid liabilities. Having created a separate corporate structure, Enterprises must also
accept the burdens of its separate existence.
Utah law recognizes the importance of the separate legal identities of
corporations and has been unwilling to permit parties to ignore the distinctions. See
14

Sachs v. Lesser, 2007 UT App 169,1J51, — P.3d —. As this Court noted: "[corporate
entities] should not be permitted to enjoy the benefits of [a company's] separate corporate
structure for some purposes while also claiming it elevates form over substance" when it
is inconvenient for another purpose. Sachs, 2007 UT App 169 at ^[51 (citing Utah State
Rd. Commfn v. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888, 891 (Utah 1975)). The general rule is that
"where persons organized a corporation to acquire the advantages flowing from its
existence as a separate entity, they should not be able to disregard the corporate entity to
gain an advantage for another purpose." Steele Ranch, 588 P.2d at 891.
The Sunridge entities chose to form Enterprises to benefit from its separate
corporate existence. The Sunridge entities cannot reap the benefits of Enterprises'
incorporation while evading the consequences to suit their convenience. In this case, the
very device that the Sunridge entities used to shield themselves from liability is their
undoing on their own claim.
IV.

ALL ARGUMENTS RELATING TO DEVELOPMENT'S
CLAIMS AND DAMAGES ARE NOT PROPERLY PART
OF THIS APPEAL.
On appeal, the Sunridge entities assert arguments relating to the

independent duty and special relationship exceptions to the economic loss rule, issues IV
and V set forth in pp. 25-40 of its brief, which related solely to Development and its
ability to recover damages. First, the Sunridge entities did not make these arguments to
the trial court and raise them for the first time on appeal. Because the trial court had no
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opportunity to rule on these issues, the Sunridge entities cannot raise them for the first
time on appeal. See Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, | 9 , 17 P.3d 1122.
In addition to failing to raise the arguments before the trial court, the issue
of Development's inability to make a prima facie claim because of a lack of proof of
damages was ruled on by the trial court. Development's lack of damages was the subject
of a second motion for summary judgment before the trial court. Development has not
appealed the trial court's ruling on this second motion for summary judgment. It cannot
therefore assert these issues on appeal.
Moreover, after the trial court's ruling on the second summary judgment
motion dismissing Development's claims and related damages with prejudice, the parties
stipulated that the Sunridge entities would not appeal that ruling. This stipulation was
memorialized in the parties' Stipulated Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 737). Development
cannot, in contravention of the trial court's ruling and its own agreement not to appeal that
ruling, claim it is entitled to recover these damages on appeal.
Undoubtedly, Development will argue that it preserved its right to appeal
the trial court's grant of summary judgment on its negligence claim; however,
Development's damages for breach of contract and for negligence are identical. Thus,
even if Development had a viable tort claim - which it does not, after the trial court
dismissed Development's claims for lack of proof of damages, the Sunridge entities
stipulated that they would not appeal that ruling. Thus, if Development had a viable
negligence claim, it would fail for lack of proof of damages.
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Accordingly, this Court should decline to consider issues IV and V of the
Sunridge entities' brief on the following grounds: (1) the arguments were not raised
before the trial court; (2) they failed to appeal the trial court's second summary judgment
ruling; and (3) they stipulated that they would not appeal the second summary judgment
ruling which determined that Development had failed to provide sufficient evidence to
make a prima facie claim for damages.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE ECONOMIC
LOSS RULE TO BAR RECOVERY IN TORT WHERE A VALID
CONTRACT PROVIDES THE SOLE REMEDY.
A.

No Independent Duty Exists.

Although RB&G does not believe the following arguments are properly
before the court by virtue of the Sunridge entities' failure to appeal the trial court's second
summary judgment ruling and their own agreement not to appeal the second summary
judgment ruling, the Sunridge entities' argument that RB&G owes Development an
independent duty and/or that a special relationship existed between RB&G and
Development both fail under well established Utah law.
American Towers3 and SME preclude the Sunridge entities' argument in
this appeal. First, Enterprises, a non-party to the contract, cannot assert a tort claim for
purely economic damages - regardless of whether it was an intended beneficiary of the
contract. See American Towers. 930 P.2d at 1188, 1192. By obtaining an assignment of

3

American Towers Owners Association. Inc. v. CCI Mechanical. Inc., 930 P.2d
1182 (Utah 1996). abrogated by Hermansen v. Tasulis. 2002 UT 52,^[17, 48 P.3d 235.
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Development's claims, Enterprises is limited to only those damages that Development
could assert. See SME, 2001 UT 54 at |16. Development did not incur the damages
which Enterprises is attempting to assert, and Development's damages claims were ruled
on in the second summary judgment motion, stipulated to by the parties, and are not
before this Court in this appeal. Thus, under American Towers and SME, Enterprises'
claims are barred by the economic loss rule.
The Sunridge entities now seek to evade the holdings of American Towers
and SME by claiming the independent duty exception to the economic loss rule applies to
their claims. The Sunridge entities argue that RB&G owed Development an independent
duty as an engineer which gives rise to a tort cause of action.4 While it is true that Utah
recognizes a narrow exception to economic loss rule when a party owes an independent
duty, the independent duty exception is not applicable in this case where RB&G's duties
arise solely from its contract with Development. In other words, the Sunridge entities
read the "independent" requirement out of the independent duty exception.

4

The Sunridge entities' argument on this point is curious because it claims, by
virtue of the assignment, that Development lacks privity of contract but has a viable tort
claim. Before the trial court, however, the Sunridge entities argued that RB&G owed
Enterprises an independent duty. Because the Sunridge entities failed to argue that
Development was owed an independent duty below, it was not preserved and cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. See Coleman, 2000 UT 98 at 1J9. Nevertheless,
because the analysis and ultimate outcome is the same as to both entities, RB&G will
address the argument as framed on appeal - namely that RB&G owes an independent
duty to Development.
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In Hermansen v. Tasulis, the Utah Supreme Court modified Utah's
economic loss rule in order to create a narrow exception to the general bar on recovery of
solely economic damages when a duty exists that is independent of and separate from the
contractual duties. See Hermansen, 2002 UT 52,1117, 48 P.3d 235. In creating this
exception, however, the Court did not abandon the original concept behind the economic
loss rule, and stated: "[t]he proper focus in an analysis under the economic loss rule is on
the source of the duties alleged to have been breached." Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at 1fl[l516 (quoting Grvnberg v. Agric. Tech, Inc., 10 P.3d 1267, 1269 (Colo. 2000) (emphasis
added)). The Utah Supreme Court has modeled Utah's economic loss rule on the
Colorado rule. See Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52,1fl|l5-l6 (quoting Grvnberg, 10
P.3d at 1269). The Colorado Supreme Court further explained the Colorado rule in a later
case:
Our economic loss rule requires the court to focus on the contractual
relationship between the parties, rather than their professional status, in
determining the existence of an independent duty of care. The interrelated
contracts contained [defendant's] duty of care. [Plaintiffs] tort claims are
based on duties that are imposed by contract and therefore, contract law
provides the remedies.
BRW, Inc. v. Dufficv & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 67-68 (Colo. 2004) (multiple inter-related
contracts between commercially sophisticated parties on a large construction project).
In order to determine if the independent duty exception applies, a two-step
analysis is used: (1) are the losses purely economic, and (2) what is the source of the duty
being imposed. See Gulfstream Aerospace Services Corp. v. United States Aviation
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Underwriters, Inc., 635 S.E.2d 38, 44 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (applying Utah's economic loss
rule and finding source of duty was contractual rather than independent). If the losses are
purely economic and the source of the duty is contractual, "it is improper further to
analyze the existence of an independent tort duty in determining whether an economic
loss may be recovered." See id.
In this case, neither party disputes that the Sunridge entities' damages are
purely eoncomic. Thus, the analysis turns on the source of the duty being imposed. The
Sunridge entities argue that professional engineers owe a duty to the public at large to
perform competently, professionally, and thoroughly. Thus, the Sunridge entities argue
that it was foreseeable that if RB&G breached its professional duty than they can recover
purely economic damages for "delays, demolition, re-construction, and re-design."
RB&G owed no independent duty to either Sunridge entity or the public at
large to produce geologic reports on the subject property involved in this case. RB&G
entered into a contract with Development to perform this analysis. To the extent the
reports were deficient, any damages are traceable solely to the reports and RB&G's
contractual obligations. Stated differently, neither Sunridge entity can seek economic
damages that arise independently of the contract or the reports. Assuming engineers owe
the general public a general duty of care, this independent duty of care was not breached
and was not the proximate cause of the damages which either Sunridge entity attempted
to recover. The damages in this case flow directly and solely from the contract between

20

RB&G and Development. As such, no independent duty exists that would allow either
Sunridge entity to recover damages from RB&G.
B.

No Special Relationship Exists.

In arguing that RB&G had a "special relationship" with its client, the
Sunridge entities are attempting to completely eviscerate long standing principles of tort
and contract law, while simultaneously attempting to effectively gut the economic loss
doctrine. The Sunridge entities' brief argues that RB&Gfs special relationship derives
from the following: "information asymmetry, engineers1 esoteric knowledge and
expertise, and their clients1 reliance thereon." In sum, because engineers have specialized
knowledge, whether it be esoteric or not, and because a client relies on this specialized
knowledge, the Sunridge entities argue a special relationship is created between engineers
and those that contract with them. The Sunridge entities' argument is that anytime a
professional possesses specialized knowledge upon which someone relies then a special
relationship is created. Thus, all professionals, according to the Sunridge entites, have a
special relationship with both their clients and anyone else who might ever rely on the
professional's expertise in making economic decisions. Fortunately for professionals in
this state, the Sunridge entities' argument is not the law on when a special relationship is
created.
As discussed above, the Sunridge entities attempt to do an end run around
basic principles of contract law in order to create a cause of action in tort. In so doing,
the Sunridge entities strain to create an independent duty running from professionals to
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clients and also now to form a special relationship. The only reason RB&G provided its
professional expertise and opinions as to the geology of the land underlying the Sunridge
project was because it entered into a contract to do so. Absent this contract, RB&G
would not have offered any opinions or services on this project. The contract provided
for the scope of RB&Gfs services and the compensation that RB&G would receive. The
only duty that RB&G owed on this project was the contractual duty of good faith and fair
dealing which arises in every contract in Utah. This duty of good faith and fair dealing
was owed to the party on the contract: Development.
In support of its special relationship argument, the Sunridge entities cite to
numerous cases in Utah which they claim support their position. Each case, however, is
inapposite. Specifically, in three of the cases, the court did not address the issue of
whether a special relationship existed. See West v. Inter-Financial. Inc., 2006 UT App
222, 139 P.3d 1059; Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins. Brown and Gunnell Inc.. 713
P.2d 55 (Utah 1986); Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Co.. 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). In two
of the other cases cited by the Sunridge entities, Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corporation.
2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283, and Hermansen v. Tasulis. 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235, the
Supreme Court, in the context of determining whether a legal duty existed, discussed that
the existence of a special relationship may give rise to a legal duty; however, the Court's
holdings merely determined that a legal duty existed given the facts and circumstances of
the case. See Yazd. 2006 UT 47 atffl[l1-26 (developer-builder may owe buyer of home a
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legal duty); Hermansen. 2002 UT 52 at Iff 18-23 (seller's real estate agent owes duty to
buyer of home).
The only other case relied on by the Sunridge entities to support its special
relationship argument is Webb v. University of Utah. As stated in Webb. "when used in
the context of ordinary negligence, a special relationship is what is required to give rise to
a duty to a c t . . .." Webb v. University of Utah. 2005 UT 80, f 12, 125 P.3d 906. In
contrast to Webb, however, the source of the duty to act in this case is the contract.
Absent the contract, RB&G owed no duty to act to either Development or Enterprises.
Once the source of the duty is found to be a contract, the inquiry as to whether an
independent duty or special relationship exists ends. See Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at %1516; Gulfstream. 635 S.E.2d at 44.
In other words, what gives rise to RB&G's duty to act is not a "special
relationship." Rather, it is a bargained for contract which defines the scope of services
that RB&G is obligated to provide. RB&G had no obligation to provide more than what
the scope of the contract required, and the contract did not transform the relationship
between RB&G and Development into a "special relationship." To the extent, RB&G
failed to fulfill its contractual obligations, the sole remedy is a claim for breach of
contract. See BRW. Inc.. 99 P.3d at 67-68.
In contrast to the tort cases where the Utah Supreme Court declined to find
a special relationship existed and therefore determined the plaintiff had no claim,
Development has a viable remedy. Its remedy is a breach of contract claim. The
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economic loss doctrine preserves the sanctity of the contract claim and requires that
parties enforce these rights and obligations through contract actions rather than tort
actions.
In addition, RB&G had no reason to know that Enterprises or other third
parties would rely on its work. At the time that Development and RB&G entered into the
contract, Development was the owner and developer of the project and Enterprises had
not been formed. RB&G could not reasonably foresee that Development would sell the
land to Enterprises and enter into a purported assignment with a sister entity when that
entity was not in existence at the time the contract was entered into and at the time RB&G
performed its obligations under the contract. As such, the Sunridge entities? reliance on
Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Co.. which holds an accountant liable when the accountant
knew that a report would be relied upon by third parties, is distinguishable because
RB&G had no ability to know a yet to be formed entity would rely on its report on this
project. See Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Co.. 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974).
£.

This Court Is Bound To Follow Its Own and Supreme Court
Precedent.

The Sunridge entities argue that this Court should follow other jurisdictions
and modify Utah's economic loss rule. "Vertical stare decisis .. . compels a court to
follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court. . . . [and] in accordance with
horizontal stare decisis, 'the first decision by a court on a particular question of law
governs the later decisions by the same court.1" State v. Tenorio. 2007 UT App 92, ]|9, —
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P.3d — (citation omitted). Accordingly, RB&G has limited its briefing to a discussion of
Utah law, and the application of Utah law to facts and circumstances in this case.
CONCLUSION
RB&G requests this Court affirm the trial court's grant of RB&G's first
motion for summary judgment. As the trial court properly concluded, no undisputed
material facts existed, and as a matter of law, both Development's and Enterprises'
negligence claims are barred by the economic loss rule. Also, Enterprises' breach of
contract claim fails due to lack of privity. Thus, Enterprises is limited to asserting
Development's damages by virtue of any assignment of claims from Development to
Enterprises. To the extent the Sunridge entities are attempting to present claims related to
Development and Development's damages in this appeal, this Court should decline to
consider those claims as the trial court's ruling on the second summary judgment motion
is not part of this appeal and the Sunridge entities stipulated that they would not appeal
that ruling.
DATED this /

/ d a y of June, 2007.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

CRAIG C. COBURN
ZAjCHARY E. PETERSON
torneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the foregoing brief were
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ( \TMlay of June, 2007, to the following:
Stephen Quesenberry
Charles L. Perschon
Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, L.C.
Jamestown Square
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, UT 84604
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ADDENDUM
Court's Order Granting RB&G's Second Motion for Summary Judgment
Final Order of Dismissal With Prejudice
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RECEIVER Judicial District Court
SEP 14 2006

° f U t ; h C 0 U ^ State of Utah

Richards, Brandt " - ^ / 2 £ J ^ l _ D e p u t y
Miller & Nelson
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

SUNRIDGE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, et al...,
Plaintiffs,

Case# 030400328

vs.

Judge Fred D. Howard

RB&G ENGINEERING, INC.,

Division 5
Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following:
Ruling
Defendant filed its most recent Motion for Summary Judgment with the Court on July 26,
2006 alleging that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case relative to its breach of
contract claims. Specifically, the Defendant claims the Plaintiff failed to produce evidence (beyond
a generalized summary produced for this litigation) of the some $388,820.21 it claims in damages,
save for the claim relative to the trenching and backfill studies in the amount of $22,207.50 .
Plaintiff argues that it has produced additional evidence beyond the generalized summary
to substantiate its damage claims. The Plaintiff acknowledges that this evidence is only now
forthcoming in the form of affidavits, but argues that admission of the evidence does not prejudice
the Defendant, and is appropriate in the interest of justice and fairness. The Defendant has countered

that admission of this new evidence is not timely, and should have been provided prior to the August
1, 2006 deadline to file any dispositive motion.
The Court notes that this case was initially filed by the Plaintiff on January 23,2003. The
Court also notes that once a case enters the discovery process both parties have an obligation under
Ut. R. Civ. Pro. 26(a)(1) to make evidentiary disclosures to one another. That is an obligation
imposed by Rule 26, it is not an obligation that arises once the opposing party requests certain
information, nor does it arise in connection with a court's scheduling order, or an order compelling
discovery (though all these things may take place during the discovery process). It is an affirmative
obligation on the part of attorneys to share relevant information at the initial stages of litigation. The
rule is designed to streamline the litigation process and, at an early stage, bring to light all relevant
information that will form the foundation of the parties' legal theories,framethe issues for trial, or,
potentially, lead to a less costly settlement.
The Plaintiff requests that this Court, in essence, place the substance of the case above
procedure, ignore Plaintiffs failure to produce its evidence timely, and proceed to trial. The Court
notes, however, that what the Plaintiff casts as "procedure" is really the Defendant's substantive right
to rely upon the record after the close of discovery and move for summary judgment to avoid the
time and expense of trial on a claim not supported by the evidence. The Utah Supreme Court has
recently held that reliance upon the rules is more than a mere formality stating: "the rules provide
the source of available relief. They are designed to provide a pattern of regularity of procedure
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which the parties and the courts can follow and rely upon." State v. Ison9 135 P.3d 861, 863 (Utah
2006), quoting Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah 1966) (internal citations omitted).
There may have been a day when parties could withhold information from one another
under the notion that the other side had not requested it, but, under the current rules an attorney has
an affirmative obligation to disclose, and to disclose timely. Rule 26 is an important part of Utah's
civil pre-trial process, and is designed to bring a transparency to litigation that serves the interests
of fairness and justice. It seems implausible to this Court that both the letter, and the spirit, of the
rule has been observed by a Plaintiff which files suit in 2003, and then, nearly four years later offers
what may be germane evidence only in response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court notes that it did not impose a discovery deadline in this case. The Defendant
has pointed out, and this Court was given to understand, that both parties represented to the Court
that discovery was complete in this case during a telephone scheduling conference on February 3,
2006. Based on that understanding the Court set August 1, 2006 as the deadline by which both
parties must file all dispositive motions, if any.
Given this case history, the August 1,2006 deadline presupposes an end to the discovery
process. By its order, the Court has directed that the attorneys can assume and evaluate the evidence
which has been discovered in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and if they choose,
make an assessment of the strength of a party's legal position. Such an assessment could not be
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made as directed by the Court if the evidentiary landscape is ever-changing1. Therefore, Plaintiff
may not "sit" on evidence whether intentional, or by oversight, while the Defendant complies with
the Court's imposed deadline, and then supplement its (the Plaintiffs) evidence as needed to defeat
the motion for summary judgment. Such procedure effectively nullifies the purpose and benefits
offered by summary judgment motions. After careful consideration, and respectfully, the Court
concludes that to receive Plaintiffs newly produced evidence under such circumstances would
constitute reversible error on the part of this Court.
The Plaintiff has been, for well over three years now, obligated to provide all information
relevant to this case to the Defendant. The Plaintiff failed to do so at his own risk. The Plaintiff
acknowledged that discovery had been completed prior to February 3, 2006. The Plaintiffs
production of, allegedly, key evidence some three years and six months after filing this case, and
over six months after the Plaintiff agreed that discovery was finished, is simply untimely. Therefore,
as to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement, this Court will only consider evidence
exchanged by the parties, and properly presented to the Court prior to August 1, 2006.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56©) states that summary judgment "shall be rendered
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
'Rule 26(a)(4)(c) does call for the exchange of exhibits thirty days prior to trial. The
practical implication of the rule is the closure of discovery at the exhibit exchange deadline.
However, all the rule does is imply the end of discovery, just as a dispositive motion deadline
implies the end of discovery. Both deadlines presuppose that the discovery period has ended.
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is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The Utah Supreme Court, in National American Life
Insurance Company v. Bayou Country Club, Inc., 403 P.2d 26 (Utah 1965), stated that summary
judgment rules "should be liberally interpreted to effectuate their purpose, to effect the prompt
administration ofjustice, and to expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials where no triable issue
of fact is disclosed." Id. at 29 (citations omitted). The purpose of summary judgment is to "provide
a means of searching out the undisputed facts" to find if the matter can be resolved as a matter of
law, thereby conserving both party and court resources. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266,1267-68
(Utah 1976).
With the exception of evidence regarding the trenching and backfill studies, as conceded
in Defendant's Reply, the Court finds that Plaintiff, Sunridge Development, has failed to martial
admissible evidence as to its claim for damages. A simple statement that one has been damaged is
not evidence; it is a legal conclusion. This Court cannot make that unsupported conclusion, and
cannot refuse a motion for summary judgment where no material fact has effectively established the
issue. For these reasons, and those argued by the Defendant, which the Court adopts and
incorporates herein, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
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The Court further directs counsel for Defendant to prepare an Order consistent with this
ruling.

Dated this /%/l_fay

of September, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

)GE FREDp. HOW
Hstrict Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the
August, 2005 to the following in the manner indicated, to wit:
by U.S. first class mail
Attorneys for Plaintiffs:
Stephen Queesenberry
J. Bryan Queesenberry
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ
3319 North University Ave
Provo, UT 84604
Attorneys for Defendant:
Craig C. Coburn
Lincoln Harris
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
PO Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465

Deputy Court Clerk
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12,

day of

FILES

?

JAN 0 5 2007

CRAIG C COBURN[0688]
LINCOLN HARRIS [8196]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for RB&G Engineering, Inc.
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
PO Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone:
(801)531-2000
Facsimile'
(801) 532-5506
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUNRIDGE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, et al.,

!

FINAL ORDER AND
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,

vs.

0701CDI3H

RB&G ENGINEERING, INC.,
Defendant.

Case No. 030400328
i
Division No. 5

Plaintiffs Sunridge Development Corp. and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC, and defendant
RB&G Engineering Inc. having, by and through their respective counsel of record, stipulated to
and moved the Court for a final, appealable order.
Based on the Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

The September 1, 2005 order on partial summary judgment is final and appealable;

C \Documents and Settings\CCC\Local Settmgs\Temp\finai order judgment dismiss revised_l wpd

The October 10, 2006 order on partial summary judgment, dismissing all Plaintiffs
remaining claims, except for Plaintiffs claim for the "RB&G Reports/Tests (post 1995)" is final, and Plaintiffs shall not appeal this order;
3.

Plaintiffs remaining claim regarding "RB&G Reports/Tests (post - 1995)" has
been fully compromised and settled and shall be dismissed on its merits with
prejudice, each party to bear their respective attorneys fees and costs.

Further, as this order disposes of all remaining claims by and between all parties to this
action and there being no reason for delay, this final order and judgment of dismissal is to be
forthwith entered.
DATED t h i s ' V ^ day of November, 200$?
By the Court:

avid N. Mortensen
)istrict Court
bounty, State of Utah

^%5f^

Stbphtd Quekpnberry
HILL JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ
Attorneys for Sunridge Development Corp.
and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC
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